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The Free Press: Essential To Robust
Debatest
Lawrence H. Cookett
It is exciting to be a part of this reception tendered to the
1989-1990 Pace Law Review Associates.
Indeed, it is a delight just to be at Pace Law - with its 800
challenging students, 47 percent of whom are women, its ever
gracious staff, its highly regarded faculty and its dynamic
administration.
Thank you, each one of you, for making me feel so welcome.
You have demonstrated that you are keenly interested in exer-
tions to establish and maintain high standards for the legal pro-
fession. Pace Law Review, born only a decade ago, is an exem-
plar of such an effort. Consistently offering quality material
submitted by students and outside authors of reknown, the Re-
view functions to apprise its readers of recent developments in
t Remarks of Lawrence H. Cooke at the reception honoring the 1989-90 Pace Law
Review Associates, on the tenth anniversary of the Pace Law Review.
tt B.S., Georgetown University, 1935; L.L.B., Albany Law School, Union University,
1938; L.L.B. (hon.) Albany Law School, Union University, 1975; Former Chief Judge of
the Court of Appeals, State of New York.
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the law, evaluating these developments and fostering stimulating
thinking among the bench and bar.
Justice Brandeis early on recognized the educational poten-
tial of such publications and encouraged their development and
use in enlightening the legal fraternities. Constructive criticism
of the courts and their decisions and in-depth analyses of partic-
ular topics provide intellectual strengths and valuable guidance
for future advocacy and decision-making. Today, law reviews
continue to provide a forum for legal debate in and beyond the
courthouse. The Pace Law Review, in this fine tradition, makes
available scholarship of the highest order and affords to students
and those admitted the opportunity and incentive to publish the
results of meticulous research into noteworthy issues, to the end
of advancing our knowledge and our understanding of the law.
You, as associates of the Law Review, are serving in the me-
dia. Or, should we more accurately call it the working press? As
editors, reporters, business managers, and faculty advisors, as
the case may be, your interest in the First Amendment can be
taken for granted. Let me read it to you again: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."1
There is then a distinction between the freedoms of "speech"
and of the "press," and the question presents itself as to
whether it is a proverbial distinction without a difference. The
Supreme Court has pointed out to us that all these rights,
though not identical, are inseparable.'
Professor of Law David Anderson of the University of Texas
pointed out in a law review article a few years ago that Chief
Justice Warren Burger during his tenure, while conceding that
the Supreme Court has never squarely resolved the question,
urged that the institutional press should not be accorded any
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. For example, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the freedom of press
does not impart separate and independent rights not available under the freedom of
speech. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978); Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10 (1978). To date, no Supreme Court
decision has rested squarely on the press clause independent of the speech clause.
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freedoms under the press clause not accorded ordinary citizens
under the speech clause. Former Justice Potter Stewart was of a
different mind: he opined that the press clause is a structural
provision of the Constitution designed to provide an additional
check on official power, and that its primary effect is to protect
editorial autonomy.4
What does legislative history reveal? On the one hand, one
might urge that there is nothing, since in 1787 there was an
overwhelming consensus in the Constitutional Convention that
the Bill of Rights was unnecessary.5 On the other hand, the sen-
timents and words of the press clause find root in a 1768 resolu-
tion of the Massachusetts House refusing the colonial Gover-
nor's request that the Boston Gazette be subjected to grand jury
scrutiny for seditious libel. In defiance, the House declared:
"The Liberty of the Press is a great Bulwark of the Liberty of
the People: It is, therefore, the incumbent Duty of those who are
constituted the Guardians of the People's Rights to defend and
maintain it."'
In 1774, shortly before the War of Independence, the Conti-
nental Congress, looking for support from Quebec, outlined the
American objective. "The importance of [the freedom of the
press] consists ... in its ready communication . . . whereby op-
pressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into more
honourable and just modes of conducting affairs."'7
The first freedom of press clauses appeared in eleven state
constitutions adopted during the Revolution.8 Of these, nine
contained freedom of the press provisions set forth in general
terms.9 Pennsylvania had the only state constitution which pro-
tected freedom of speech as well as of the press.10 Significantly,
3. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 459-60, (1983).
4. Stewart, "Or Of The Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975).
5. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, 106-25 (1955).
6. Resolution of the Massachusetts House (1768), quoted in, L. LEVY, LEGACY OF
SUPPRESSION 69 (1960).
7. Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec, 1774, quoted in, 1 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL
OF RIGHTS 233 (B. Schwartz ed. 1980) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ].
8. Anderson, supra note 3, at 464.
9. Id.
10. The Pennyslvania provision read: "That the people have a right to freedom of
speech, and of writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom of the
press ought not to be restrained." Schwartz, supra note 7, at 266.
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Madison's first draft of what would become the First Amend-
ment, as submitted to the First Congress, contained the lan-
guage from Pennsylvania's Constitution, the only original state
to give such protection to freedom of speech.1' Despite a lengthy
House discussion, the meaning of "freedom of the press" was not
debated, and the redrafted language of a selectcommit-
tee - "The freedom of speech 2 - and of the press . . . shall
not be infringed" was not disturbed." In the Senate, an attempt
to limit freedom of the press by providing that it be protected
"[i]n as ample a manner as hath at any time been secured by the
common law" failed.14 This defeat of the proposed change had
vast implications: it meant that the common law's half-hearted
embrace of press freedom - no prior restraint but unlimited
post-publication punishment - would not be an attribute of our
Constitution. It meant that the law of the land would not pro-
vide the constitutional milieu for the imprisonment of editors
because of their criticism of government. It kept the new govern-
ment away from a dangerous and unworthy path.
The legislative history of the press clause is inconclusive,
not only because that is the usual character of legislative history,
but also because the Founding Fathers did not indicate what
they meant by "freedom of the press." Some conclusions, how-
ever, are permissible. First, freedom of the press, whatever it
meant, was a matter of great concern. Nine of the eleven states
which adopted constitutions during the Revolution protected
it." Every version of the Bill of Rights taken up by the First
Congress included a press clause and no suggestion was made
that it be deleted.
Second, freedom of the press was neither equated with nor
viewed as a derivative of freedom of speech. The theory that the
press clause was merely "complementary to and a natural exten-
sion of Speech Clause liberty," is not supported by historical
events."0 Actually, the press clause was primary and the speech
11. Anderson, supra note 3, at 478.
12. Id.
13. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 808 (1789).
14. JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 70 (1789)(J. Gales & W. Seaton
Printers 1820), quoted in, Anderson, supra note 3, at 480.
15. Anderson, supra note 3, at 464.
16. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
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clause secondary.
"Third, there is no evidence that the framers intended to
protect freedom of the press qualifiedly.' 17 In the debates of the
Constitutional Convention and the First Congress, no one ex-
pressed any fear of the power of the press and no one suggested
that it was necessary to balance the freedom of the press against
other interests.18
Fourth, and most important, freedom of the press was re-
garded not merely as a desirable civil liberty, but as a matter
integral to the framework of the new government. The underly-
ing thrust of most, if not all, official declarations on the subject
was that freedom of the press was a necessary constituent of
self-government.19
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill20 summed
it up very well when it declared that the constitutional guaran-
tee of freedom of the press is not so much for the benefit of the
press as for the benefit of all the people, and that a "broadly
defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our po-
litical system and an open society."'" Such a political course of
action and such goals deserve our constant dedication. As a mat-
ter of fact, the strength of America, different than in any other
country of the world, has been in its openness.
I am concerned. I am concerned about three important re-
cent Supreme Court decisions which, with the spotlight focused
on the much publicized flag desecration and abortion cases, went
almost unnoticed.
In the first, decided on June 22, the "high court" upheld a
jury verdict against the Hamilton, Ohio Journal News 22 because
its account about Connaughton, a political candidate, did not in-
clude information that would have made the story more bal-
anced.2 3 Until then, in a number of holdings, the Court refused
concurring).
17. Anderson, supra note 3, at 488.
18. The Senate had one proposal to limit protection of the press to those protections
afforded by common law; it was defeated. Anderson, supra note 3, at 481.
19. LEVY, supra note 6, at 145-62.
20. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
21. Id. at 389.
22. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
23. Id. at 2697-98.
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to impose liability on a newspaper for material it did not print
or consider. Libel would be found only in what was printed.24
The new case erodes that principle.
In the second matter, DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 25 the
Supreme Court refused to review a jury award of $2,000,000 in
punitive damages, $210,000 in compensatory damages, and
$561,000 in interest against the Pittsburgh Post Gazette.26 This
confirmed the largest libel award ever given in this country. The
newspaper was held responsible for publishing a defamatory
statement from an official proceeding - in DiSalle a sworn
statement in pretrial proceedings - that usually is not punisha-
ble if it is repeated in the context of a fair and accurate account
of a judicial proceeding.27
In the third, a nonmedia matter, the Court refused to find
that there was a constitutional limitation on punitive damages. 28
I am troubled. I am troubled because imposing punitive
damages in order to "punish" the press will have an enormously
chilling effect. Libel suits inhibit journalists by making them ex-
cessively cautious about (and being able to prove) all of the
facts. Journalists and authors should base their reporting on the
facts; but sometimes a government, a corporation, or an individ-
ual hides and refuses to divulge them. In such instances, the
press must be free to make legitimate inferences about public
issues.
In libel cases, are courts to tell newspapers how to write and
edit their stories in the first place? In judging malice, is a publi-
cation's persistent interest in uncovering wrongdo-
ing - muckracking if you will - as in one of the Tavoulareas
v. Washington Post Co. 29 decisions a few years ago - "relevant
to the inquiry of whether a newspaper's employees acted in
24. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
25. DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 530-31 n.10, 544 A.2d 1356 n.10.
28. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989)
(eighth amendment excessive punishment clause does not apply to awards of punitive
damages).
29. Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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reckless disregard of whether a statement is false or not[?] 30
Should jury verdicts in cases involving the First Amendment
right of freedom of the press be subjected to the same appellate
review as in a fall-down lawsuit, where a jury award may be set
aside only after every favorable inference is accorded the award?
The implications for each of us are frightening. Are those in
the media to stop looking into our halls of government, our busi-
nesses affected with a public interest, the public welfare? At the
moment, a sword hovers over the head of every member of the
press and media doing his or her job. It is in reality a sword over
the Constitution itself. This danger must be fought in the
courts, in the legislatures, and in public forums.
The press and the media, down through the years, have
been the benefactors of the citizenry. Their efforts, their inter-
est, their "hard-hitting investigative stories" seeking out illegali-
ties, irregularities, and matters of public concern should be
neither chilled nor barricaded.
Albert Camus, the French writer whose works express a cou-
rageous humanism, saw it this way: "A free press can of course
be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom it will
never be anything but bad . .."31
I still find the holding of New York Times v. Sullivan32 very
persuasive. It balances the scales between the free press and re-
sponsible reporting.
Punitive damages in libel cases tend to undermine the com-
monweal and should be severely restricted, if not abolished. The
real purpose of a libel suit should be to offer a forum to prove
what was said or written was false and to decree a full measure
of compensatory damages, if warranted.
Media writers and commentators should be permitted to
serve the common good as conspicuous contributors to the
"uninhibited robust and wide open" debate on public issues en-
visioned by our Founding Fathers and confirmed by the Su-
preme Court in its 1964 Sullivan ground rules.
May the Pace Law Review continue to be distinguished by
its mark of excellence!
30. Id. at 121.
31. A. Camus, Defense of Freedom: Homage to an Exile, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION,
AND DEATH 102 (1961).
32. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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